Methodological mimesis and the value of pharmaceutical failures by McGoey, Linsey
 1
 
Methodological mimesis and the value of pharmaceutical failures 
February 22, 2009  
 
Draft paper, please don’t cite without permission of the author.  
 
Linsey McGoey, PhD 
Institute for Science, Innovation and Society 
University of Oxford 
Linsey.mcgoey@sbs.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Recent controversies over the safety of drugs such as Vioxx, a painkiller 
manufactured by Merck, and Seroxat, an SSRI antidepressant manufactured by 
GlaxoSmithKline, have led to a consequence that at first seems entirely positive: they 
have attracted more attention to the suppression of negative clinical trial data by industry 
and academic researchers, helping to establish clinical trial registries where randomized 
controlled trials (RCTs) must be registered at their outset.  
In this paper, through a focus on debates over the safety of selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants such as Seroxat, I examine recent efforts to 
provide more public access to clinical trial data, documenting how, despite declarations 
of their commitments to openness, pharmaceutical companies have found ways to evade 
the need to publicly disclose trials. Secondly, I suggest the emphasis on securing more 
access has fostered the adverse effect of deflecting attention from methodological 
limitations within studies that are widely available. Drawing analogies to work by 
Bourdieu, I argue that a paradoxical consequence of the demand for more access is the 
tendency to solidify faith in the moral authority of RCTs, something that inadvertently 
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strengthens the authority of those, such as regulators and industry groups, which withheld 
RCT data to begin with.  
I suggest it is the very limitations of RCTs – their inadequacies in producing reliable 
evidence of clinical effects – that help to strengthen popular and scientific assumptions of 
their superiority as methodological tools. This point sheds light on the question of why 
systems widely recognized to be ineffective often assume greater authority at the very 
moment when people speak of their dysfunction. 
 
GlaxoSmithKline, Seroxat and access to data 
Although researchers such as Iain Chalmers, a co-founder of the UK Cochrane 
Collaboration, have argued for over two decades of the need for more access to RCTs 
(Chalmers 2006, 1990; Roberts et al. 1998), there was little political impetus to insist 
companies disclose data until cases such as GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)’s suppression of 
Seroxat data, its bestselling antidepressant, drew public scrutiny to the pharmaceutical 
industry’s tendency to disclose only favourable clinical trials.  
Suspicions that GSK suppressed clinical trial data led to legal actions in the UK, 
where the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), the UK 
equivalent to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) launched a criminal 
investigation in 2003 to ascertain whether GSK had withheld information on the drug’s 
effect, and in the United States, where the former New York Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer launched a lawsuit in August 2004 accusing GSK of consumer fraud by depriving 
consumers and doctors of information necessary to make informed decisions (Lancet 
2004). GSK later settled out-of-court with Spitzer, refusing an admission of wrongdoing, 
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but agreeing to pay a fine of $2.5 million. In the UK, after a nearly four-year 
investigation, the MHRA announced that although GSK had acted, in the view of 
regulators, unethically by internationally withholding clinical trial data on the efficacy 
and safety of Seroxat, the agency did not have the legal means to prosecute the company, 
because of previously undetected loopholes in the UK’s 1968 Medicines Act (MHRA 
2008). 1  
The case of Seroxat reinforced calls for more equitable access to clinical trial data, 
calls that at first seemed answered by the pharmaceutical industry’s insistence that it 
would voluntarily post details of trials on databases managed by industry, as well as by 
the UK Labour Party’s insistence, in its 2005 election manifesto, that it would pass laws 
to ensure industry complied with the need to register trials.  
In recent years, it has been apparent these initiatives have failed to produce many 
practical changes. As Tim Kendall, co-director of the UK National Collaborating Centre 
for Mental Health said to me during an interview in December 2006: 
TK: The Labour government stated in their manifesto for the last election that they 
would make it mandatory for drug companies to publish their trials. It has not 
become mandatory in any meaningful way. Indeed, although the ABPI [Association 
of the British Pharmaceutical Industry] asserts that drug companies do publish all 
completed trials, it is impossible to prove whether or not this is happening. Eli Lilly 
do list large numbers of trials on their website, many of which have not been 
published…However, there are a growing number of trials referred to as ‘ongoing’ 
and some of these have been ‘ongoing’ since 2000. Perhaps ‘ongoing’ has now 
replaced ‘unpublished.’ 
 
A separate but related barrier facing access to data is that, as the UK  health 
minister noted in February 2008, EU legislation prevents the UK government from 
                                                 
1 For details of the legal ramifications of GSK’s suppression of data for Seroxat (manufactured as Paxil in 
the United States), see McGoey, L. and Jackson, E.’s (2009) “Seroxat and the suppression of clinical trial 
data: regulatory failure and the uses of legal ambiguity.” Journal of Medical Ethics 36(2): 107-112.  
 4
delivering on the Labour party’s 2005 election promise and forcing companies to publicly 
disclose all clinical trial data (Rose 2008).  
Frustrated with the ineffectiveness of current systems of disclosure, public health 
scholars in the United States have called for a “Sarbanes Oxley for Science,” a reference 
to US securities legislation passed in the wake of the Enron and Worldcom scandals in 
the early 2000s. The fraud committed at Enron, Worldcom and other companies led to 
creation of the 2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act, the largest overhaul of corporate governance 
securities legislation since the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Paredes 2003; 
Heminway 2003). Sarbanes Oxley enforces a number of new regulations, such as the 
need for the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of publicly listed 
companies to verify the truthfulness of a company’s financial certificates, risking 
criminal penalties if found guilty of fraud. Scholars such as David Michaels have 
suggested that developing parallel legislation – a “Sarbanes Oxley for Science” – would 
help tackle the problem of the underreporting of clinical trials at places such as 
GlaxoSmithKline (Michaels 2006): 
When the Enron and WorldCom scandals were revealed, the executives of those 
firms claimed that they were unaware of the accounting misrepresentations in 
which their companies were engaged…At present, there is virtually no oversight 
or independent review of corporate decisionmaking as it relates to the 
sequestration of scientific data. An important lesson of the accounting scandals is 
that responsibility must be linked with accountability; this should apply to 
scientific as well as financial data (Michaels 2006: 16). 
 
 Michaels suggests a Sarbanes Oxley for Science “would require corporations to 
designate a person responsible for reporting the results of studies undertaken by the firm” 
(Michaels 2006: 16), as well as ensure more access to the raw data – anonymized data on 
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patients participating in trials – in both industry-sponsored and publicly funded clinical 
trials.  
Although his proposal has some merits, it also raises a number of problems with 
calls in general for more access to clinical trials data. The first problem is Michaels’ 
implication that mere access will foster the ability of regulators to act on data that is 
disclosed. In the case of the SSRI controversy, access to data alone was not sufficient to 
ensure prompt regulatory action. Institutional factors, such as the UK regulator’s 100 per 
cent funding reliance on industry for the service of licensing medicines, seem to have 
compounded the inability of the MHRA to access swiftly in publicly disclosing data 
which it did receive from industry (McGoey 2007).  
The case of SSRIs is similar to Enron, where some suggest that problems emerged 
not simply from Enron’s refusal to disclose accurate financial statements, but also from 
the inability of financial analysts and other financial actors to effectively interpret data 
that was available, something perversely compounded by an excess, rather than a lack, of 
information (Macey 2003; Gladwell 2007):  
In the case of Enron, it was well known to many, especially to insiders, that the 
company and its reported growth were problematic and the collapse in retrospect 
was perhaps predictable, just as the fact of the September 11 attack on the US (if 
not the timing) is being reported in hindsight as predictable. But for the 
institutional actors at the time (financial analysts, accountants, FBI, CIA) it is 
necessary to understand the conditions under which such predictions and 
warnings could not be uttered, or if they were, could not be heard and processed 
(Hutter and Power 2005: 12). 
 
 There are numerous parallels between Enron and the SSRI case. For example, 
from the early 1990s onwards, as a result of anecdotal evidence from physicians that 
suggested SSRIs were contributing to suicidal reactions in some users, the MHRA 
conducted more than six internal inquiries in order to determine the safety and efficacy of 
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SSRIs. During a 2003-4 investigation into the safety of SSRIs, the MHRA discovered 
that daily doses of SSRIs of more than 20 milligrams were no more effective at treating 
depression, regardless of its severity, than doses of 20mgs or less. At the time 17,000 
individuals in Britain were receiving daily doses of SSRIs at 30, 40 or 60 mgs, therefore 
increasing their risk of suffering adverse effects, without any improvement in efficacy. 
This newfound understanding about the ineffectiveness of higher dosing levels was not 
prompted by newly submitted information, but from a reanalysis of clinical trial data 
which had been in the MHRA’s possession for over ten years, and which the MHRA had 
either not detected, or been unable to act on publicly, at an earlier time (McGoey and 
Jackson 2009).  
Difficulties in interpreting data are compounded by numerous methodological 
limitations of RCTs for psychiatric drugs, such as the limitations of rating scales in 
measuring responses to medication, and biases stemming from patient recruitment 
criteria, that make it difficult to determine the safety and efficacy of drugs such as 
Seroxat when distributed among a clinical population, even when clinical trial data is 
widely available. In the next section, I briefly examine such methodological limitations, 
before discussing why such limitations have the adverse effect of solidifying, rather than 
indicting, the value of RCTs in determining a treatment’s efficacy.2  
The limits of RCTs in psychiatry 
  In order obtain a product license for a new pharmaceutical, or to extend the use of 
an existent product to a new indication, manufacturers must submit a certain number of 
                                                 
2 The following description of methodological limitations is a cursory one, touching on just recruitment 
bias and problem with ratings scales.  Numerous other factors, such as endpoint recording; placebo 
response (For an overview of some of the politics and implications of placebo use in trials see Wahlberg 
2008); and discrepancies between statistical significance and clinical efficacy, have a bearing on the value 
of the evidence derived from RCTs.  
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positive RCTs to regulators. The need to test products via the methodology of RCTs 
raises specific challenges, as Andrew Lakoff notes, for the field of psychiatry, where the 
process of diagnosing patients often varies between different clinical observers, making it 
difficult to find a standardized group of subjects eligible for enrolment in a clinical trial.   
In response to this, researchers developed rating scales, such as the Hamilton 
Rating Scale for Depression, where behaviour and mood is codified and categorized 
according to standardized checklists. Patients receive a score for responses to questions 
about mood, insomnia and so on – and the final score is used to help determine the 
severity of a patient’s illness. By translating “subjective experience into quantitative cut-
off points and outcome measures, [rating scales] make it possible to assemble and 
compare groups of patients across sites and between evaluators” (Lakoff 2007: 58). Even 
though manufacturers “are quite sceptical about the capacity of the standard rating scales 
to produce a consistent patient population for testing… and also that the scales are 
applied inconsistently by raters,” they must adhere to regulatory demands to demonstrate 
a consistent drug response (Lakoff 2007: 65).  
Often, as psychiatrists have described to me during interviews, standardized 
scales are imported to a trial without adequate consideration of whether the 
measurements are appropriate for the age of the subjects in a trial. One psychiatrist I 
spoke with in March 2005 suggested that in examining SSRI trials in children, the 
MHRA did not take into account whether the measurement tools used in some of the 
studies were appropriate for a paediatric population. In some cases, three-year-old 
toddlers were given written questionnaires to read and respond to:  
I did try and question the MHRA about the assessment tools they used in 
these trials, where they’ve got very young children. Because with very young 
 8
children, you do not give them questionnaires. You give them picture 
questionnaires. Because, you cannot assess a fifteen year old in the same way 
as you would assess – if you can believe it, some kids as young as three had 
[written questionnaires]…But [the MHRA] were not won over to tell me 
what the assessment methods were.  
 
When designing an RCT to test a new antidepressant, the demands of selected a 
standardized group of patients are complicated by the requirements of ethical review 
boards in North America and Europe, which often stipulate that the more severe a 
person’s disorder, the greater the ethical duty to avoid placing such a patient in a 
randomized trial (Miller and Brody 2002; Miller and Silverman 2004). In recent years, 
ethical review boards in the US and UK have sought to adhere to statutes such as 
Helsinki by demanding that researchers curtail the use of placebo in clinical trials, as well 
as avoid recruiting subjects at the severe end of a disorder. 
A result of the stipulation against placebo use, as a psychiatrist based at the 
University of Oxford described during an interview in February 2005, is that much of the 
available RCT data for antidepressants is “necessarily skewed towards the relatively 
mild, trouble-free end. Because they’re the only people that it’s actually ethical to put in.”  
Another psychiatrist, who holds a senior position at the UK’s Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, mentioned the same problem: “you almost have to be well in the States to 
get on a trial. Because if you’ve got anything wrong with you, you get excluded.”  
An epidemiologist I spoke with said he found it unsurprising that antidepressant 
trials had not shown the suicidal risk later suspected by practicing clinicians because 
“they select out all the suicide people. That’s what you do in clinical trials. There’s 
nothing underhand about that.” There may be nothing underhand about that tendency, but 
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it does raise the question of the usefulness of RCTs in determining clinical effects among 
patients routinely excluded from trials for ethical reasons.  
To researchers and clinicians, these points are not surprising. If anything, the 
opposite is true: what is surprising is how mundane such methodological obstacles appear 
to those conducting and implementing RCTs. The question, though, is why such 
mundane difficulties are difficult to challenge except with recourse to the very 
methodological tools found wanting to begin with.  
RCTs and the complicity of failure in cementing authority 
 
During controversies over the safety of pharmaceuticals, individual criticisms of 
RCTs, in order to be viewed as legitimate challenges, often have to be corroborated with 
reference to RCT data that contests earlier studies, something that inadvertently the 
strengthens the authority of the methodological tools which failed to produce reliable 
evidence in the first place. This point helps to address the question of why controversies 
from seemingly antithetical parties – such as those who insist on the need for more access 
to data, and those who insist on the commercial imperative to withhold trials – tend to 
strengthen the rhetorical and practical authority of a particular methodology or system at 
the very moment when that system is subject to escalating public scrutiny and attack.   
An analogy can be drawn to work by Bourdieu, who suggests, in the essay 
“Rethinking the State: genesis and structure of the bureaucratic field,” that state 
injunctions owe their obviousness, and thus their potency, to the fact that the state has 
sought to impose the very cognitive structures through which it is perceived. He suggests 
that people respond doxically, or pre-reflexively, to a social world riddled with “calls to 
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order,” and argues this pre-reflexive submission helps to explain the ease with which the 
state maintains its monopoly over physical and symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1999: 69).  
 From this insight, I draw a simple but useful point. It is within the nature of any 
authoritative power to influence and prescribe even the forms of resistance which that 
authority has engendered in the first place. An invulnerability of method emerges, 
something I term “methodological mimesis.” A reason for this is that the personal illusio 
of individuals, or their shared sense of investment in the rules of a game and its outcome, 
tends to structure resistance to the game itself according to certain tacit assumptions 
(Bourdieu 1992: 66). An example appears in Bourdieu’s analysis of the Barthes-Picard 
Affair in France, where he analyzes the debates between Roland Barthes and Raymond 
Picard, two literary critics who differed in their interpretation of Racinian tragedy. For 
Bourdieu, despite their apparent conflict, a shared faith of both scholars was their belief 
in the value of studying classical French thinkers such as Racine. Thus “behind their 
apparent dispute lay a certainty ‘complicity,’ ‘the consensus in dissensus which forms the 
unity of the intellectual field” (Lane 2000: 73; see also McGoey 2009). 
The mimetic power of dominant methodologies is comparable to what Michael 
Power, a theorist of risk and accounting, describes as the opacity of auditing processes. 
“Audits,” Power argues, have a “remarkable capacity of being invulnerable to their own 
failure.” When attention turns to isolated audit failures, individuals are typically blamed 
instead of the circumstances in which they worked.  
Rightly or wrongly, corporate collapse is always accompanied by scrutiny of the 
role of the auditors and, in some cases, litigation on the grounds that they have 
performed their task negligently. One of the surprising features of these experiences 
is that they tend not to call into question the role of the audit itself.  Instead, where 
audit has failed, the common response has been to call for more of it. Indeed, the 
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great puzzle of financial audit is that is has never been a more powerful and 
influential model of administrative control than now, when many commentators  
talk of an auditing crisis (Power 1994: 7). 
 
Financial or pharmaceutical failures are useful, in other words, for the authorities 
which preside over those failures. What has rendered RCTs for psychotropic drugs so 
invulnerable to the widespread recognition of their inadequacies? Why is the authority of 
RCTs augmented, rather than diminished, the more people point out the deficiencies 
within individual studies? One answer lies in the influence of methodological mimesis. 
The solution to failed audit is more audit. The solution to failed RCTs is more RCTs, 
their shortcomings magnified through techniques such as meta-analyses which aggregate 
individual studies, strengthening the authority of methodologies that led to failure in the 
first place. 
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